NYLS Law Review
Volume 40
Issue 1 Volume XL, Numbers 1 & 2, 1995

Article 11

January 1995

THE MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT: AN OVERVIEW
Hon. Harold Baer Jr.
Joseph P. Armao

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hon. Harold Baer Jr. & Joseph P. Armao, THE MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT: AN OVERVIEW, 40 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 73 (1995).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

THE MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT: AN OVERVIEW
HON. HAROLD BAER, JR.* & JOSEPH P. ARMAO**
I. HISTORY OF THE COMMISSION

For the past hundred years, New York City has experienced a
twenty-year cycle of corruption, scandal, reform, backslide, and fresh
scandal in the New York City Police Department. The Lexow Committee
of 1894,1 the Curran Committee of 1913,2 the Seabury Committee of
1930,1 the Harry Gross investigation of 1950,' and the Knapp
Commission of 19711 have each served as critical signposts of a regular
and repetitive cycle of police corruption within the New York City Police
Department (NYPD). The creation of the Mollen Commission,6 the most
recent independent inquiry into police corruption, marks only the latest
chapter in this historical pattern.
In May, 1992, six police officers assigned to two separate Brooklyn
precincts were arrested on charges of participating in a conspiracy to sell
* Harold Baer, Jr. is a United States District Court Judge for the Southern District
of New York. Judge Baer was a member of the Mollen Commission.
** Joseph P. Armao is a partner at Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, & Sheinfeld. Mr.
Armao was Chief Counsel to the Mollen Commission.
1. SENATE COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE POLICE DEP'T OF THE CITY OF N.Y. (Jan.
18, 1895) (Senator Clarence Lexow, Chair) [hereinafter Luxow COMM. REP.].
2. SPECIAL COMM. OF THE BOARD OF ALDERMAN OF THE CITY OF N.Y. TO
INVESTIGATE THE POLICE DEP'T (June 10, 1913) (Henry H. Curran, Chair).
3. StiP. CT., APP. DIV., FIRST JUD. DEP'T, FINAL REP. OF SAMUEL SEABURY,
REFEREE, IN THE MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE MAGISTRATE CTS. IN THE
FIRST JuD. DEP'T AND THE MAGISTRATES THEREOF, AND OF ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW
PRACTICING IN SAID CTS. (March 28, 1932) (Samuel Seabury, Referee).
4. In 1950, 21 police officers were indicted for accepting regular payoffs from
gambler Harry Gross. See William Murphy & Leonard Levitt, It's Blue Deja Vit; New
ScandalReadsLike Old Police Stories, N.Y. NEVSDAY, June21, 1994, at 7 (discussing
the similarities and differences between corruption scandals revealed by the various
commissions from 1894 to the present).
5. N.Y. CITY COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND

THE CITY'S ANTI-CORRUPTION PROC. (Dec. 26, 1972) (Whitman Knapp, Chair)
[hereinafter KNAPP COMM'N REP.].
6. N.Y. CITY COMM'NTO INVESTIGATE ALLEOATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROC. OF THE POLICE DEP'T (July 7, 1994) (Milton Mollen, Chair)
[hereinafter MOLLEN COMM'N REP.].
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narcotics in Suffolk County.7 The arrests were made by Suffolk County
Police, not by the NYPD Internal Affairs Unit.8 Shortly thereafter, the
press disclosed that one of the officers, Michael Dowd, had been the
subject of more than fifteen corruption allegations within the NYPD over
a six-year period,9 however not a single complaint had ever been
substantiated despite abundant evidence of Dowd's criminal activities.
Dowd's case caused widespread concern about the extent and nature of
police corruption and the NYPD's competence and commitment to combat
it.
In July, 1992, almost exactly twenty years after the Knapp
Commission published its final report, Mayor David N. Dinkins
established by executive order a temporary mayoral commission to
investigate issues of police corruption. Commonly referred to as the
Mollen Commission after its Chairman, Judge Milton Mollen, the
Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the
Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department was asked to
examine three areas of deep public concern: (1) the extent and nature of
corruption within the NYPD; (2) the NYPD's policies and procedures for
corruption control; and (3) improvements and reform for the detection and
prevention of corruption within the NYPD. °
The Mayor's executive order empowered the Commission to subpoena
witnesses and documents, to take testimony under oath, to conduct private
and public hearings, and under limited circumstances, to grant immunity
from criminal prosecution."
After assembling a small staff of attorneys, investigators and analysts,
and armed with the powers provided by the executive order, the
Commission embarked on a wide-ranging investigation to determine
whether the corruption of Michael Dowd and the NYPD's failure to
apprehend him were a unique happenstance or reflected deeper problems
within the Department. The Commission centered its attention on the
nature and extent of police corruption, on the NYPD's ability and will to
control corruption, and on the police values and culture that might allow
such corruption to exist. The Commission staff reviewed thousands of
NYPD policy documents, personnel files and corruption case files;
conducted hundreds of private hearings and interviews with private
7. See Craig Wolff, Lawyer Says Lx-Officer Ready to Admit Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 1993, at B3.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. N.Y., N.Y., Exec. Order 42 (July 24, 1992) (establishing the Mollen
Commission, in which the five members of the Commission were appointed by thenMayor David N. Dinkins).
11. ld. §3.
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citizens and former and current police officers, including some officers
who had previously been convicted of corruption charges; audited and
conducted performance tests of the principal components of the NYPD's
anti-corruption units, recruitment process, and training program; and
initiated a number of field investigations of police officers, police
precincts and specialized police units where analysis had indicated that
police corruption existed.12 The Commission's field investigations met
with much success. In conjunction with the United States Attorney and the
Manhattan District Attorney, the Commission's corruption investigations
led to criminal charges against seven police officers in Brooklyn's 73rd
Precinct and fourteen police officers in Manhattan's 30th Precinct.13
Commission investigators also uncovered evidence of substantial
corruption in a number of other precincts in Manhattan, Brooklyn and the
Bronx. During the course of its two-year investigation, the Commission
developed extensive evidence concerning the nature and extent of police
corruption, the NYPD's capacity to eliminate it, and the Department's
institutional values and culture that permitted it to exist. The Commission
held public hearings in September, 1993,'" in which corrupt police
officers, honest police officers, NYPD corruption investigators,
high-ranking NYPD officials and other knowledgeable parties testified
about the state of police corruption, its causes, the NYPD's reluctance to
address the problem and possible solutions to break the twenty-year cycle
of scandal and subsequent short-lived reform that has afflicted the NYPD
over the last century.
On July 7, 1994, the Commission issued a final report stating its
conclusions on corruption and corruption control. The Commission
divided its Report into four principal areas of discussion and analysis: the
state of police corruption, the quality of the NYPD's integrity controls, the
problem of police values and culture that fuel and protect corruption, and
recommendations for internal and external reform to remedy the
problem.15 More than prior inquiries into police corruption, the
Commission sought not only to correct corruption once it surfaced, but
sought also to attack corruption's root causes to prevent it from happening
yet again.

12. See MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 6, at 11-12.
13. Id. at 11.
14. Id. at S.

15. Id.
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THE STATE OF POLICE CORRUPTION

The Commission found that the large majority of New York City
police officers are honest and want to see corrupt officers removed from
their ranks. Nonetheless, the Commission found that the corruption of
Michael Dowd was not isolated nor aberrational, but represented a serious
and alarming form of police wrongdoing that exists, in varying degrees,
in patrol precincts throughout the City.' 6 Today, police corruption
predominantly involves the narcotics trade. Gambling, prostitution and
other vice rackets are no longer the springboard to a career of corruption
in the Police Department as they were in times gone by. The longstanding
unwritten rule-accepted by most in the Police Department before, up to,
and including the Knapp Commission's era-that narcotics graft is "dirty
money" has completely disappeared. Today, with the rule diluted, the
cocaine and crack trade provides corrupt officers with abundant
opportunity to steal money, drugs and guns from drug dealers and to assist
drug traffickers who pay handsomely for non-enforcement of the law.
The Commission found evidence of police officers profiting from the
drug trade in a variety of ways, including: (1) selling confidential police
information, escorting the transportation of drugs and drug money and
using police powers to harass rival drug dealers;' 7 (2) stealing drugs,
money and handguns from street dealers;"8 (3) robbing drug dealers and
their customers; 9 (4) burglarizing drug dens and stash houses;' and (5)
selling stolen drugs and guns to other officers or to drug dealers.2 '
Modem corruption is not about "accommodation," where police officers
sell immunity from arrest or conviction. The distinction between the
criminal and the corrupt cop has disappeared. Corrupt cops no longer
merely use their authority to exact payoffs; they now actively engage in
criminal activity. Corruption assumes the nature of its provenance.
Paralleling the violent world of narcotics trafficking, police corruption has
become aggressive, extortionate and an often violent abuse of authority by
officers who actively seek out opportunities to profit from the criminals
they are sworn to arrest.
The Commission found that police perjury and brutality were
frequently linked to narcotics corruption. Officers engaged in drug crimes
must often commit perjury and falsify official police records to conceal
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.

21. Id.
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their corrupt acts. When officers unlawfully searched premises, stopped
vehicles or seized individuals to steal drugs, guns and money, they had to
falsify police records and even perjure themselves before grand juries and
the courts to justify their actions.'
Traditionally, police corruption and police brutality were treated as
two distinct manifestations of police wrongdoing. Corruption is about
money; brutality is about the violent abuse of authority. Thus, while
Internal Affairs investigates corruption, the Civilian Complaint Review
Board (CCRB) investigates brutalityY One of the Mollen Commission's
principal findings demonstrates that in contemporary policing, corruption
and brutality were often linked.' The Commission found that brutality
was, at times, an introduction and, at others, a companion to narcotics
corruption.' This is not to say that brutality was a stranger to corruption
in the days of the Lexow Committee,' but rather that the high stakes that
characterize the contemporary narcotics trade seem to breed greater
violence and brutality. Police officers told the Commission during private
interviews and public hearings that they were initiated into the world of
corruption by committing acts of brutality.'
Acts of violence against
suspects and prisoners were used as a barometer to prove an officer was
a tough cop who could be trusted and accepted by fellow officers. In other
instances, the Commission observed, acts of violence were carried out to
assist and promote other corrupt acts. In the most glaring examples, one
30th Precinct officer shot a drug dealer with his service revolver while
attempting to steal a package of cocaine;' another officer, assigned to a
Bronx precinct, testified to random beatings in and around suspected drug
locations as a show of police power.29
22. Id. at 36.
23. Id. at 45 (noting that, until recently, investigations of police corruption and
brutality have been dealt with separately).
24. Id. (noting, for example, that police officers did not simply become corrupt;
they sometimes became corrupt and violent).
25. Id. (noting, for example, that one officer not only robbed a drug courier, but
also shot him in the stomach and another officer shoved a gun into a drug dealer's mouth
and demanded information about when and where money would be collected so the
officer could steal it).
26. LEXoW COMM. REP., supra note 1 (noting many members of the police force
abused the resources of physical power to make arrests and to satisfy their personal
brutal instincts).
27. See MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 6, at 47 (stating that some officers
testified that brutality served as a rite of passage to other forms of corruption and
misconduct).
28. See id. at 45.

29. See id. at 48.
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After the arrest of Michael Dowd and before the beginning of the
Mollen Commission's tenure, NYPD officials contended that police
corruption was a matter of individual officers seizing sporadic
opportunities to make a quick score.' The Commission, however, found
that today's corruption rarely involved a single police officer secretly
taking advantage of an isolated opportunity. While nothing like the
standardized and hierarchical system that characterized the gambling pad
of yesteryear exists today, contemporary corruption typically involves
groups of police officers-called "crews"-who actively seek out
opportunities to score from drug dealers through protection rackets,
larceny, extortion, burglary and robbery. 1 Crews act with varying
degrees of organization and coordination to identify targets, determine
roles in carrying out the corrupt act and divide profits. As the Mollen
Commission's Report described them: "crews are akin to street gangs:
small, loyal, flexible, fast moving, and often hard hitting. "3
The Commission's investigation into the 73rd Precinct in Brooklyn,
for example, revealed a crew of eight to ten patrol officers who, for two
years, regularly broke into drug dens to steal money, drugs and guns. 3
They used code names over the NYPD radio to plan and coordinate their
illegal raids; they assigned themselves roles to perform in assaulting their
targets; they used NYPD equipment to gain entry to fortified locations;
and they then, in or around the stationhouse or at secret off-duty locations,
divided stolen money and other contraband.
The magnitude of today's corruption threatens social order in many
communities. Corruption flourishes in the streets and residences of
high-crime, drug-infested neighborhoods that are most often populated by
the poor and powerless, minorities and undocumented immigrants, as
officers take advantage of the opportunity to profit from these groups.
Throughout its Report, the Commission emphasized that police
corruption did not exist in a vacuum. While making clear that corrupt
officers were ultimately responsible for their actions, the Commission
Report pointed out that police corruption was a multi-dimensional problem
that was often fueled by police culture and the NYPD's own institutional
behavior. Over the last century, recommendations born of previous
investigations have dealt primarily with how the Department might be
restructured and how additional layers of investigative and prosecutorial
effort, both from within and without the Department, might reduce
corruption. It is the Mollen Commission's fundamental premise that a
30.
31.
32.
33.

See id. at 10.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 17.
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more robust remedy to the problem of effective corruption control must
include attacking corruption's causes and not merely its symptoms.
III. POLICE CORRUPTION: THE EFFECT OF POLICE CULTURE
Greed will always be the principal cause of police corruption. But a
belief that police corruption is exclusively about illicit profits and can be
solved by a more vigilant Internal Affairs Bureau fails fully to reflect the
complexity of the problem. The Commission observed a variety of other
influences and attitudes that push police officers to abandon their integrity,
including: the desire, especially among the more youthful, to experience
power and thrills; a divisive hostility between the police and much of the
public that creates an "Us against Them" mentality; adherence to a "code
of silence" that keeps even honest cops silent about the misdeeds of their
colleagues; and a belief that the Department-despite rhetoric to the
contrary-cares much less about the integrity of the rank and file than
about protecting the careers of its commanders.'
The Commission found that corruption flourished in part because the
NYPD's systems for stopping it were in a shambles. Not only did the
Commission find that Internal Affairs had become feckless since the time
of the Knapp Commission, but that the entire anti-corruption apparatus35
was more likely to minimize and conceal corruption than uncover it.
The Commission also found that no real effort had been made to attack the
root cause of corruption.
In the Commission's view, the NYPD suffered from a departmentwide reluctance to uncover corruption and thereby expose itself to the
public discredit that such revelations inevitably produce.36 As a result,
avoiding scandal was more important than fighting corruption. The former
chief of the NYPD's Internal Affairs testified at the Commission's public
hearings that his superiors wanted to avoid bad publicity even at the cost
of corruption control. 7 Institutional reluctance to uncover corruption
contaminated the entire anti-corruption apparatus from recruitment,
training, supervision and command accountability to investigations and
intelligence gathering. This message was not lost on the cops on the beat.
In their view, the police brass were so worried about a career free from
34. See id. at 21,25, 56, 58, 64 (describing the influences and attitudes that compel
police officers to commit corrupt acts).
35. Id. at 70.
36. See id. at 71.
37. Id. at 70 (referencing former Internal Affairs chief's testimony that "[all parts
of the department's corruption systems had been functioning terribly for years [and that]
top commanders . . .didn't seem too concerned . . . because it guaranteed no bad
headlines").
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revelations of corruption, that insuring the integrity of their commands
was often less important than protecting their careers. Some officers took
this message to mean that they had free rein on the streets.
These factors became most evident in police precincts serving the
City's poorest and most disadvantaged neighborhoods. The NYPD
practiced an unwritten policy of populating such precincts, known as
"dumping grounds," with incompetent and undisciplined officers,
worsening what were already eorruption-prone assignments.3" The
Commission found that it was in such precincts that the code of silence
and the "Us against Them" mentality were strongest.3 9 This is what
happened in the 73rd Precinct when a crew of all white cops practiced
their trade on the minority residents of that precinct.' It would be easy
to say this was simply a black/white problem, but while that may be a
facet, it is not the whole answer. For example, in the 30th Precinct, where
the community is poor and minority, the bad cops were mostly minorities.
With more time, the Commission might have sorted out these conundrums
and reached some conclusions; without it, they have remained questions
that deserve further study.
Perhaps the Commission's most cogent illustration of police
corruption's evolution came through the testimony of Kevin Hembury, a
former police officer assigned to Brooklyn's 73rd Precinct in
Brownsville-one of the NYPD's better known dumping grounds.
Hembury testified that he became a police officer because he wanted to
help people. But within months he was helping himself to their money,
drugs and guns.41 The reasons this transformation occurred were the
most important messages of the Mollen Commission's work.
At the Police Academy, an officer testified, he had learned that cops
were different from the society they police, that the police are "us" and
the public is "them"-that a cop must be prepared to do anything for
himself and his comrades to insure that "them" never get the better of
"us." When Hembury reported for duty to the 73rd Precinct for the first
time, he already knew the reputation of his assignment. Although a rookie
cop, he knew the 73rd was basically a minority precinct and was
considered a dumping ground. It was a place where the thousands of
law-abiding, hard-working citizens that lived and worked in the
neighborhood were lost among dope dealers, prostitutes, junkies, thieves
and murderers. Unfortunately, many of the officers of the precinct
38. Id. at 61.
39. Id. at 58.
40. See, e.g., Chapin Wright & T.J. Collins, ProtestersRing Police Station, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, Sept. 14, 1989, at 7 (describing an incident where citizens in the 73rd
Precinct witnessed white police officers brutalize black suspects during an arrest).
41. MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 6, at 62.
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practiced an abusive and corrupt method of policing that they justified as
the only means to survive in a crime-ridden ghetto. Hembury, white,
twenty-one years old and new to the Brooklyn ghetto, followed along and
he, too, became abusive and corrupt. a2
Survival required forging close ties with his police partners. He had
to assure them that he was a "good cop" who would keep his mouth shut
about their wrongdoing and he relied on them to do the same for him.
According to this officer's testimony, protecting yourself and your fellow
officers was a code that recruits learned and willingly accepted within the
Police Academy. 43 On the dangerous streets of the 73rd Precinct, group
loyalty might be a matter of life and death. Yet, it could also become a
dependable cover for corruption.
After a year of patrolling the streets of the 73rd Precinct, Hembury,
in fact, became known as a "good" cop among his fellow officers. His
reputation earned him an invitation to participate in conducting "raids,"
jargon for groups of police officers conducting warrantless searches of
drug dealers, crack houses, drug dens and apartment buildings. At first,
Hembury testified, he believed, or pretended to believe, that, although
illegal, these raids had a law enforcement purpose: to display the power
of the police, to frighten away drug dealers and to make arrests. But
Hembury and his crew had crossed the line to corruption notwithstanding
their self-concocted justifications. Within short order, no justification was
necessary and raids became a regular means for the police to line their
pockets with money and drugs stolen from the pockets and hiding places
of drug dealers and drug dens."
How did this happen? Hembury's corruption, like that of all the
officers the Commission interviewed, was fundamentally the result of his
own bad judgment. No one is to blame for an officer's corruption more
than himself. Certainly, even in the most severe circumstances, corruption
is not inevitable, as legions of honest cops prove everyday. But the lesson
the Commission report teaches about police corruption is that a variety of
factors peculiar to police work contribute to corruption and must be taken
into account in devising strategies to stop it.
Kevin Hembury, like all the other corrupt officers who gave evidence
to the Commission, testified that the combined forces of greed, frustration
and power made temptation of corruption all the more powerful.' The
role of greed is obvious and, as when corruption appears in any
profession, it explains much. But frustration and the lure of power
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
See id. at 55.
Id. at 25-26.
See id. at 62.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

particularly exert their influences on police officers, especially those
continually exposed to plentiful opportunities for corruption spawned in
neighborhoods captured by crime and drugs.
Frustration arose from the sense that the Police Department had
abandoned them to a dumping ground where there was small hope for
career advancement and wide disbelief that police efforts could ever stem
the tide of crime. In the face of such circumstances, Hembury and other
officers decided to take things into their own hands. They used their
powers as police officers to profit personally from problems they could
never conquer. To demonstrate to the drug dealers that despite
appearances that they were still in charge, they began to break down
doors, and to threaten and beat suspects.' They thought of themselves
as tax collectors rather than police officers and robbed criminals where
they could not become their partners.
Secure behind the "blue wall of silence" and buoyed by sparse and
ineffective supervision, raids in the 73rd Precinct grew more frequent and
more sophisticated. Police officers participating in these raids used the
Police Department radio to signal each other, using code names, and met
in groups at clandestine locations leaving their sectors unpoliced. 47 The
officers would assign each other tasks for the raid, such as covering the
rear, or breaking down the door and eventually would split the loot in
places like a stationhouse bathroom or a parking lot."
These raids continued for over three years, unchecked by precinct
supervisors or Department corruption investigators. As this officer
testified, he personally committed hundreds of acts of corruption, and yet
neither he nor any of the other officers of his crew ever received a single
disciplinary charge based upon these corrupt acts. The corruption became
routine, an everyday part of the unquestioned conduct of a number of
police officers assigned to the precinct. In a word, it became systemic.49
Kevin Hembury and other corrupt cops who testified taught the
Commission crucial lessons about police corruption as it exists today.
First, corrupt officers are no longer simply condoning criminal activity
like gambling or prostitution in exchange for regular, unlawful
supplements to their salaries. Today, cops are engaged in the crime itself
by trafficking in drugs, burglarizing premises they are sworn to protect
and robbing individuals they are sworn to arrest. Second, brutality is a
form of police corruption and not merely a form of police misfeasance.
The two are linked and need to be investigated as part and parcel of an
46. See id. at 25.
47. Id. at 27.
48. Id. at 27-28.
49. See id. at 25-28.
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identical problem. And perhaps, most important, police culture-the code
of silence, the "us" against "them" mentality, the training and assignment
procedures and the general cynicism about their own
department-influences the state of police corruption and the ability to
combat it successfully.
Brutality complaints are referred to or made directly to the CCRB.
As a consequence, they are likely not to be thought of as corruption
complaints or as part of a pattern. Now that the Mollen Commission has
uncovered the close connection between brutality and corruption, perhaps
the CCRB should look differently at the complaints they process. It may
be that the person making the complaint is the one courageous citizen
prepared to stand up and that a pattern of corrupt activity might be
uncovered by a broader investigation. The CCRB is a valuable outlet for
complaints against police and must be preserved. Some of us suggest,
however, that in light of the Commission's findings, a closer scrutiny of
brutality complaints might lead to uncovering broader patterns of police
misconduct.
IV. POLICE CORRUPTION: THE COMMISSION'S SOLUTION
In fashioning a remedy to corruption problems, the Commission kept
the events of Hembury's and other corrupt officers' careers firmly in
mind. Unlike past Commissions, where the recommendations focused on
restructuring the department, beefing up investigations and redoubling
prosecutions of corrupt officers, the Mollen Commission took a broader
approach. The Commission firmly accepted the premise that the NYPD
must remain accountable for keeping its own house in order.' But the
Commission, at the same time, recognized that police management suffers
from strong internal pressures to avoid uncovering corruption. The
Commission contended that without a transformation of police culture, no
set of corruption controls-no matter how well designed-would be
successful. The Commission urged the NYPD to undertake a dual-track
approach to improving police integrity. The first track focused on the
NYPD's internal operations; the second, on the creation of an outside
monitor that would insure the vigilance and commitment of the NYPD's
own efforts to stop corruption now and in the future.5 1
The Commission viewed the control of corruption as requiring an
effort beyond that provided by an office of internal affairs. The Final
Report proposed over 100 recommendations for reform of recruitment,
screening, training, supervision policies, command accountability, internal
investigations and police culture and management. At the heart of the
50. Id. at 110.
51. Id.
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recommendations was the Commission's challenge to the NYPD to attack
the widespread tolerance for wrongdoing that affects even its otherwise.
honest members and to address negative aspects of police culture and
policing policy that breed corruption and brutality.

There can be no substitution for Academy training. At the Academy,
we found no course taught by an "outsider," i.e., a civilian. All courses

were taught by members of the Department. 2 The Academy had not
updated its anti-corruption curriculum since an early 1970's training film.
The kinds of problems encountered today as found by the Commission
apparently played no part in the Department's program. Drawing on this

record, it is hard to believe that the Department had given much attention
to anti-corruption training.

Some members of the Commission believed that important and totally
overlooked areas of study included the fact that there was no diversity

training.

In a City such as ours, where the majority is black and

Hispanic and the Police Department is 80% white,' such an omission is
hard to countenance.
The Commission recommended the creation of a permanent outside
monitor to identify and investigate corruption trends; to evaluate the
performance of the NYPD's anti-corruption systems; and to help
transform institutional policy and cultural conditions that nurture
corruption. 55
The current debate between the Mayor and the City Council primarily
reflects a difference of opinion as to the breadth of investigative powers
that should be given to any new and independent entity. ' The
Commission carefully considered various oversight models. These models
52. Id. at 123. The Commission recommends the use of civilian faculty at the
Police Academy to help minimize the in-bred group acculturation to corruption and to
expose recruits to non-police points of view.
53. See Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., Speech: The Mollen Commission and Beyond, 40
N.Y.L. SciH. L. Rav. 5 (1995).
54. See generally Catherine S. Manegold, Rally Puts Police Under New Scrutiny,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1992, at 35 (estimating a minority population of 22% within the
New York Police Department).
55. MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 6, at 152.
56. See Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, No. 402354, 1995 WL
478872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 30, 1995) (holding that Independent Commission created
by the City Council was given "investigatory powers far beyond the needs of a merely
advisory panel, inviting, as it does, investigation into individual acts of corruption, in
direct competition with the law enforcement agencies possessed of the duty to conduct
such investigations"), appealdocketed, No. 95-3710 (1st Dep't N.Y. App. Div. Nov.
16, 1995).
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included an Inspector General, special prosecutor and others.57 After
much discussion with representatives around the State who are experienced
in such matters, it concluded that an independent board with a small staff
and without a prosecutional role, would best suit current needs. The
Commission was clear that primary responsibility was to remain with the
Department. It was equally clear that the prosecutorial role should remain
with the District Attorneys and the U.S. Attorneys. Nonetheless, the
Commission desired and sought an executive order setting up a Board or
Commission that would provide investigative and auditing oversight. The
Commission felt subpoena power and investigative power were essential,
and was equally anxious to study the culture problems so prominent
among the recommendations. The Commission envisioned a small staff of
a dozen or so investigators, accountants and academics. The Board or
Commission would consist of five unpaid people with staggered terms.
This is the intent of City Council Local Law No. 13 which passed over
the Mayor's veto in January, 1995.58 Without commenting on that veto,
it deserves noting that the Mayor originally sought a special prosecutor
with more investigative clout and at greater expense than the Council's
version.59 Now the Mayor has by executive order appointed a group of
creative and bright men and women to a more limited commission with
virtually no independence and instead dependent, in large measure, on
decisions of his Commissioner of Investigation.'
Twenty years ago, Detective Frank Serpico 61 told the Knapp
Commission: "We must create an atmosphere in which the dishonest
officer fears the honest one, and not the other way around." 62 The past
twenty years have shown that the NYPD still finds it difficult to create
that atmosphere. The Mollen Commission's recommendation to create an
outside corruption monitor intended to supply the NYPD with the
permanent help to do so.

57. See MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 6, at 150-152.

58. See Mayor of New York, 1995 WL 478872 (invalidating the Commission
established by the New York City Council because it infringed upon the Mayor's
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